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Part I
Introduction
Milan Čermák et al. Detection of DNS Traffic Anomalies in Large Networks 2 / 21
Motivation
Almost every Internet communication is preceded by
a translation of a domain name to an IP address.
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DNS Traffic Monitoring Benefits
DNS packets are not encrypted.
Knowledge of a queried domain can extend capabilities of
current anomaly detection methods.
Possibility to detect anomalies in a DNS traffic itself.
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DNS Traffic Attacks and Anomalies
Malicious domains queries
Botnet C&C (domain-flux and fast-flux domains),
Malware spread,
. . .
Amplification DDoS attacks
And many others . . .
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DNS Traffic Attacks and Anomalies
Malicious domains queries
Botnet C&C (domain-flux and fast-flux domains),
Malware spread,
. . .
Amplification DDoS attacks
And many others . . .
Attacker
Victim
192.168.254.6
DNS
DNS
DNS
Query:zfkfkfkfa.comzANY
SourcezIP:z192.168.254.6
Size:z72zB
Answer:z204.46.43.28z...
DstzIP:z192.168.254.6
Size:z4015zB
Milan Čermák et al. Detection of DNS Traffic Anomalies in Large Networks 4 / 21
Research Questions
1 How can DNS traffic be effectively analysed in large
networks?
2 What are the differences in the analysis of DNS traffic using
standard and extended flow records?
3 What are the advantages of combinating DNS traffic
information with flow records for network anomaly detection?
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Part II
DNS Traffic Monitoring
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Flow Based DNS Traffic Monitoring
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Flow Based DNS Traffic Monitoring
Flow data
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Flow Based DNS Traffic Monitoring
Cumulative Distribution Function of DNS Packets per Flow
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Up to 99% of flows with port 53 contain only one packet.
⇒ Flow aggregation is not used.
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Extended Flow Expiration Algorithm
GenerateExtendedFlow (incoming packet)
1 Parse flow information F from incoming packet header.
2 Check if incoming packet contains a valid DNS header.
3 Parse DNS packet and create a flow record Fext = F · FDNS .
4 Export a flow record Fext without storing in a flow cache.
5 Otherwise update flow record F in a flow cache.
Main Contribution
Significant reduction of flow cache memory
occupation due to immediate export of a flow record. !
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Part III
DNS Traffic Anomaly Detection
Using Standard Flows
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Amplification DDoS Attack
LANInternet
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The attack is characterised by a large amount of same
queries with spoofed IP address.
Detection Method
Increasing count of flows, with high bytes-per-packet ratio and
the source port 53.
Access control lists reflecting network security policy.
Usually threshold adjustment is required.
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Part IV
DNS Traffic Anomaly Detection
Using Extended Flows
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Amplification DDoS Attack
LANInternet
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Detection Method
Malware infected device or misconfigured DNS resolver
recognition instead of using basic flow statistics.
⇒ The problem is to distinguish a regular DNS server
responding to a query containing a local domain.
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Amplification DDoS Attack
DetectOpenDNSResolver (DNS response)
1 Request all information about a domain Fext .Qname in the
response by ANY query type.
2 Check if the result contains at least one IP address from
a local network.
3 If yes, then add domain to a whitelist of local domains.
4 Otherwise report Fext .IPsrc as open DNS resolver.
Detection Results
Proposed algorithm
Open Resolver
Scanning Project
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Detections
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External DNS Resolver Usage Detection
LANInternet
TAP
Flow Probe
DNS
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DNS
Resolver
Usage of an external DNS resolver may cause delay and also
presents a security risk if the external DNS resolver responds
with fraudulent IP addresses.
Detection Method
In well-maintained networks is based on access control lists.
In not well-maintained networks is a problem to distinguish
between a client device and a local DNS resolver.
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External DNS Resolver Usage Detection
DetectExternalDNS (DNS response)
1 Get time of the response Fext .Tstart and IP address of queried
domain Fext .Rdata.
2 Check if client Fext .IPdst visits queried domain during
Fext .Tstart + 2 sec.
3 If yes, then return client Fext .IPdst as device using external
DNS resolver.
Detection Results
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Malware Domains Query Detection
LANInternet
TAP
Flow Probe
DNS
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DNS
Resolver
DNS queries generated by botnets (command and control
center) or domains used for a malware spreading.
Detection Method
Check all queried domains whether they are occurred in any
malware domains blacklist.
⇒ Testing all queried domains may be very time
consuming.
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Malware Domains Query Detection
GetMalwareAffectedDevices ()
1 Detect device querying the domain Fext .Qname =
dns.msftncsi .com.
2 Select next N queried domains.
3 Exclude domains occurring in the Alexa top domains list.
4 Check the rest of domains if they are in blacklists.
Detection Results
Domain Number of blacklists
habble.ru 6
www.softosystem.com 7
cybeitrapp.info 5
telemetry.tanzuki.net 5
cybermindtool.info 4
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Part V
Conclusion
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Conclusion
DNS information does not affect the privacy of users.
IP flows represents optimal choice for a large scale network
monitoring.
Proposed updated DNS flow exporting algorithm saving
a flow cache and exporting only necessary DNS packet fields.
New network anomaly detection algorithms using DNS
extended flows.
https://is.muni.cz/publication/1131184?lang=en
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